Article: Jeff Speaks, Truth theories, translation manuals and theories of meaning

Truth theories, translation manuals, and theories of meaning

Jeff Speaks

January 20, 2006

Versions of the Davidsonian program in semantics aim to use a Tarskian truth theory to accomplish the tasks of a theory of meaning. In “Truth and Meaning,” Davidson identified two related aims for the theory of meaning: (i) to give the meanings of expressions of the language, and (ii) to explain the semantic competence of speakers of the language, by stating information knowledge of which would be sufficient to understand the language.

From the start, the attempt to use a truth theory to accomplish these tasks faced a number of fundamental objections. In the last thirty years, though, a number of variants of Davidson’s original framework have been proposed to avoid these objections.

The question I wish to raise in this paper is: do any of the proposed modifications of Davidson’s original theory validate the idea that, as Davidson put it, we find in Tarskian truth theories “the sophisticated and powerful foundation of a competent theory of meaning”?

I will argue that they do not. To show this, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of two traditional problems for the Davidsonian program, and the solution to these problems offered by Max K¨olbel in his “Two Dogmas of Davidsonian Semantics.”

Here.

Article: Nathaniel Goldberg, Triangulation, Untranslatability, and Reconciliation.

Nathaniel Goldberg (2009). Triangulation, Untranslatability, and Reconciliation. Philosophia 37 (2).

Donald Davidson used triangulation to do everything from explicate psychological and semantic externalism, to attack relativism and skepticism, to propose conditions necessary for thought and talk. At one point Davidson tried to bring order to these remarks by identifying three kinds of triangulation, each operative in a different situation. Here I take seriously Davidson’s talk of triangular situations and extend it. I start by describing Davidson’s situations. Next I establish the surprising result that considerations from one situation entail the possibility that at any one time one language is partially untranslatable into another. Because the possibility is time-indexed, it need not conflict with Davidson’s own argument against the possibility of untranslatability. I derive the result, not to indict Davidson, but to propose a new kind of triangulation, the reconciliation of untranslatability, which I investigate. Insofar as triangulation is central to Davidson’s views, getting a handle on his various triangular situations is key to getting a handle on his contributions to philosophy. Insofar as those contributions have enriched our understanding of how language, thought, and reality interrelate, extending Davidson’s model promises to extend our understanding too.

Here.

Podcast: Gavagai!

This week, we continue our look at translation by examining the extreme case of radical translation. How do you translate from a language which has no connection with yours and of which you do not speak a single word, and what does all this have to do with the mysterious word 'gavagai'?
We also continue our look at the challenges of translating philosophy this week focusing on translating French, German and English.


Guests
Dr Jean-Philippe Deranty
Acting head, Department of Philosophy
Macquarie University


Dr David Braddon-Mitchell
Senior lecturer, Philosophy
University of Sydney


Presenter
Alan Saunders

Here.

Article: Hans-Johann Glock, Relativism, commensurability and traslatability

RELATIVISM, COMMENSURABILITY AND TRANSLATABILITY
Author: Glock, Hans-Johann1
Source: Ratio, Volume 20, Number 4, December 2007 , pp. 377-402(26)
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing

Key: - Free Content - New Content - Subscribed Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:
This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hacker in supporting roles. I distinguish conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defend a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and reject the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson.

Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00374.x
Affiliations: 1: Philosophisches SeminarUniversität ZürichZürichbergstrasse 43CH-8044 Zürich, Email: glock@philos.uzh.ch

Here